UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JERRY ATHAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:06-cv-273

v.

Honorable Wendell A. Miles

BRAD PURVES et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate total exhaustion of available administrative remedies with regard to all Defendants, the Court will dismiss his complaint without prejudice.

Discussion

I. <u>Factual allegations</u>

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF). In his *pro* se complaint, he sues Riverside Food Service Director Brad Purves, Facility Manager Darris Payton, and Warden Carmen Palmer.

Plaintiff claims that in November 2005, Defendant Purves terminated him from his work detail in the RCF main kitchen because of Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. He

argues that in doing so, Purves violated Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policy, Plaintiff's due process rights, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 and 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 26 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Payton failed to intervene and correct Purves' unlawful conduct. Plaintiff argues Defendant Palmer should have reviewed Step I of his prison grievance procedure but failed to do so, and further failed to correct the situation. For relief, Plaintiff requests reinstatement to his kitchen work detail with accommodation for his disabilities plus back pay; or reassignment to a vacant kitchen position that does not require lifting heavy equipment; compensatory damages; and attorney fees and costs.

II. Lack of exhaustion of available administrative remedies

Plaintiff has failed sufficiently to show exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust available administrative remedies. *See Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and applies to all suits regarding prison conditions, regardless of the nature of the wrong or the type of relief sought. *Porter*, 534 U.S. at 520; *Booth*, 532 U.S. at 741. A district court must enforce the exhaustion requirement *sua sponte. Brown v. Toombs*, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998); *accord Wyatt v. Leonard*, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999).

A prisoner must allege and show that he has exhausted all available administrative remedies and should attach to his § 1983 complaint the administrative decision disposing of his complaint, if the decision is available.¹ *Brown*, 139 F.3d at 1104. In the absence of written

¹To assist prisoners in meeting this requirement, this Court advises prisoners to attach copies of documents evidencing exhaustion in its form complaint. The form complaint, which is required by local rule, is disseminated to all the prisons. *See* W.D. MICH. LCIVR 5.6(a).

documentation, the prisoner must describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome so that the Court may determine what claims, if any, have been exhausted. *Knuckles El v. Toombs*, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, a prisoner must specifically mention the involved parties in the grievance to alert the prison officials to the problems so that the prison has a chance to address the claims before they reach federal court. *Curry v. Scott*, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001); *Thomas v. Woolum*, 337 F.3d 720, 735 (6th Cir. 2003); *Vandiver v. Martin*, No. 02-1338, 2002 WL 31166925, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2002) ("The issues [plaintiff] may raise, and the defendants he may name, in his lawsuit are limited to the specific issues raised, and the specific individuals mentioned, in his grievance."). A civil rights action containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed for lack of total exhaustion. *Jones Bey v. Johnson*, 407 F.3d 801, 805-09 (6th Cir. 2005), *accord Rinard v. Luoma*, 440 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming *Jones Bey*).

Here, Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies against all the Defendants he names in his complaint. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he properly pursued his grievance through all levels of review only as to Defendant Purves, but not as to Defendants Payton or Palmer. Therefore, because his complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, his complaint must be dismissed for lack of total exhaustion. *See Jones Bey*, 407 F.3d at 809.

Because the exhaustion requirement is no longer discretionary, but is mandatory, the Court does not have the discretion to provide a continuance in the absence of exhaustion. *See Wright*, 111 F.3d at 417. Rather, dismissal of an action without prejudice is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to show that he exhausted available administrative remedies as to all defendants.

See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 645; Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104; White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997); Vandiver, at *2. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's action without prejudice.

It is not clear whether Plaintiff may still grieve his claims. Under the policy of the prison, complaints must be resolved expeditiously, and complaints may be rejected as untimely. *See* MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶G(4). The Sixth Circuit has held that an inmate cannot simply claim that "he has exhausted his remedies or that it is futile for him to do so because his grievance is now time-barred under the regulations." *Hartsfield v. Vidor*, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing *Wright v. Morris*, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997)). However, even if the MDOC considers a subsequent grievance to be untimely, a prisoner who has presented a grievance through one complete round of the prison process will nevertheless be deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). *See Thomas*, 337 F.3d at 733.

Because the exhaustion requirement is no longer discretionary, but is mandatory, the Court does not have the discretion to provide a continuance in the absence of exhaustion. *See Wright*, 111 F.3d at 417. Rather, dismissal of an action without prejudice is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to show that he exhausted available administrative remedies. *See Freeman*, 196 F.3d at 645; *Brown*, 139 F.3d at 1104; *White*, 131 F.3d at 595. Dismissal for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies does not relieve a plaintiff from payment of the civil action filing fee. *Smeltzer v. Hook*, 235 F. Supp. 2d 736, 746 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (citing *Omar v. Lesza*, No. 97 C 5817, 1997 WL 534361, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1997)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

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Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the

Court will dismiss Plaintiff's action without prejudice because he has failed to show exhaustion as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no

good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$455

appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is

barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is

barred, he will be required to pay the \$455 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 18, 2006

/s/ Wendell A. Miles

Wendell A. Miles

Senior U.S. District Judge

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